When a mutual fund has persistent demand for a priced factor, the fund needs to rebalance its portfolio’s exposure to that factor as stock characteristics change over time. We establish this behavior of “factor rebalancing” and examine its …

Slicing an asset by payout horizons unseals information about its future returns and cash flows. As an example, we slice an equity market index into granular pieces (dividend strips) and show that valuation ratios of its strips span the underlying …

We analyze the impact of rating agencies' beliefs on credit markets. We measure their beliefs as the difference between their forecasts of aggregate credit spreads and the consensus. When rating agencies become more optimistic, they issue higher …

Rational expectations imply that the current long-term interest rate should already incorporate public knowledge of anticipated increases in short rates. Yet, there is a widespread misconception that expected future shifts in the short rate forecast …

Each quarter, the Treasury Department unveils its refunding plan, detailing the following quarter's treasury issuances in terms of size and maturity composition. We document substantial positive returns on long-term Treasurys on the day before these …

We study how noise trading flows impact the cross-section of asset prices in a market where sophisticated investors enforce no-arbitrage. In our model, individual asset flows, aggregated at the factor level, drive fluctuations in factor risk premia, …

I document a robust pattern in how Treasury market participants' yield curve expectations respond to new information: forecasts for short-term rates underreact to news while forecasts for long-term rates overreact. I propose a new explanation of this …

The ratio of long- to short-term dividend prices, “price ratio” ($pr_t$), predicts annual market return with an out-of-sample $R^2$ of 19%, subsuming the predictive power of price-dividend ratio ($pd_t$). After controlling for $pr_t$, $pd_t$ …

Delegation bears an intrinsic form of uncertainty. Investors hire managers for their superior models of asset markets, but delegation outcome is uncertain precisely because managers' model is unknown to investors. We model investors' delegation …